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GLISSMAN v. EKLOF MARINE CORP. 
United States District Court, Eastern District New York 
No. 85 CV 4339, 1989 WL 88058 (E.D. N.Y.) 
28 July 1989 
One may be considered an employer for the purposes of the Jones Act if it orders, instructs or otherwise exerts control 
over the seaman. One who exerts possession and control over a vessel may be liable for claims of unseaworthiness 
irrespective of lack of ownership. 
FACTS: In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he suflered in­
juries while employed by the defendant EklofMarine Corporation 
<"Eklof'l, as a seaman on Barge E-17. Plaintiff argues that the 
injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence and the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel. Eklof contended that the 
plaintiff cannot maintain an action against it under the Jones 
Act because it is not the plaintiffs employer: and that no claim 
of unseaworthiness lies because it does not own the barge. 
The defendant maintained that the A & C Ship Fueling Corpo­
ration I "A & C"l employed the plaintiff. Eklof produced 1983 
and 1984 W -2 income tax forms issued by A & C to the plaintiff. 
Eklof also asserted that A & C owns the E-17 and offered an 
inspection certificate issued by the United States Coast Guard 
indicating that A & C is the owner. Eklof did not produce a 
certificate of title. 
The plaintiff maintained that Elkof was his employer, offering 
his pension fund statements from New York Marine Towing 
and Transportation Industry Pension Fund !"Marine Towing" I 
listing Eklof as the plaintiffs employer. Plaintiff also produced 
union dues receipts issued by Marine Towing designating Eklof 
as employer. Plaintiff also asserted that all his orders and duties 
pertaining to the E-17 were given by Mr. Eklof, head dispatcher 
for the defendant. Eklof did not dispute this fact. 
In support of his contention that the defendant owns the E-17, 
plaintiff submitted as evidence a violation from the Coast 
Guard issued in January 1986, ltwo years after his injuries! 
indicating that Eklof owns the E-17. 
ISSUES: 11 I Does a question of fact exist in this case as to who 
the plaintiffs employer was for purposes of the Jones Act? 
<21 May a claim of unseaworthiness be asserted 
against a party in possession and control of a vessel, or only 
against an owner? 
ANALYSIS: An action brought under the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. §688 may only be brought by a seaman against his 
employer. Karvolis v. Constellation Lines, SA., 806 F.2d 49, 52 
( 2d Cir. 1986) In order to determine who is a seaman's employer, a 
court must look to "the plain and rational meaning of employment 
and emplo.Yer'." Mahramas v. AmericanExportlsbrandsten Lines, 
Inc., 475 F.2d 165, 171 <2d Cir. 1973), ( quoting Cosmopolitan 
Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 ( 19491 1. 
Tlie court must also consider who exercises control over the 
seaman and who instructs the seaman as to his duties and 
obligations of the vessel. This court cited with approval the Fifth 
Circuit's decision in Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, 
Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 19801, that held that an entity 
that borrows a worker may become his employer for purposes of 
a claim under the Jones Act if that employer exerts control over 
the worker. 
The court believed that the plaintiff produced sufficient evi­
dence to create a jury question as to whether Eklof controlled 
him, and therefore denied defendant's Jones Act motions. 
On the claim of unseaworthiness the court noted that case law 
makes it clear that it is not necessary that a defendant have title 
to or be the record owner of the vessel to be held liable. Karvolis 
v. Constellation Lines, S.A., supra. One who operates, manages 
or charters a vessel exercises such control and possession of the 
vessel to be its owner pro hac vice. Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 
410,412-413 ( 1963). 
Although the court was faced with conflicting Coast Guard 
documents of ownership of the E-17
d 
the court found a material 
question of fact as to whether Eklof di possess and control the E-17 
so as to be considered the owner pro hac vice. The defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the claim of unseaworthiness 
was therefore denied. 
B.J. Calamari '92 
KUEHNE & NAGEL <AG & CO.) v. GEOSOURCE, INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 5 June 1989 
874 F.2d 283 
Admiralty jurisdiction does not exist for a claim of breach of a contract to transport goods on through bills of lading over 
land and sea, as this is not a contract for a traditional maritime activity. There is no admiralty jurisdiction for a claim for 
the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation unless the Executive Jet requirements are met. 
FACTS: The action involved a cargo shipment that became 
stranded in Turkey during its journey from Western Europe to 
the Middle East. The parties to the action include the three 
freight forwarders - Kuehne & Nagel 1AG & Co.l !''Kuehne & 
Nagel'"l, Panalpina Welttransport Gmbh i''Panalpina"l, and 
SGS Control! Co., mbH i''SGS"i, who made an agreement with 
Geosource, Inc. 1''Geosource" I, a Houston based company which 
owned all of Geosource Co., and also owned one-half of Ucamar 
Shipping & Transportation 1Cayman1 Ltd. 1"Ucamar"1, and, 
Ristram Seetransport Management Gmbh 1Ristram 1Germany11 
1 ''Ristram .. 1 which owned the other half of Ucamar, to ship 
cargo. The parties intended to form a consolidated shipping line 
under the auspices of Ucamar. 
To facilitate this goal and obtain business from European 
freight forwarders, a promotional meeting was sponsored by 
Geosource tor Ucamar in November 198:.:!. After the presentations 
were made, the three freight forwarders contracted with 
Geosource to ship cargo on Ucamar's through bills of lading. 
The commercial advantage which Ucamar possessed enabling 
it to attract customers was its ability to draw upon the combined 
expertise of Geosource and Ristram which covered both segments 
of the targeted route. Ristram contracted to provide Ucamar 
with licenses, stevedoring services and facilities to receive cargo 
m Turkey. Ucamar was to obtain bills of lading for the cargo to 
be transported and utilize local contracts to guarantee delivery 
to Iran via overland shipment from Turkey. 
The forwarders· cargo was loaded in late 1982 but while in port in 
Turkey in March 1983, Ucamar was unable to unload some of the 
cargo and clearance through Turkish customs severely-delayed 
the initial deliveries. Each party involved blamed the other for 
the difliculties which ensued and the end result was a breakdown 
of the entire arrangement. 
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff' has a cause of action in admiralty 
based upon the maritime tort offraudulent inducement to contract 
and a cause of action for breach of a maritime contract based upon 
the through bills of lading? 
ANALYSIS: The district court decided that admiralty juris­
diction did exist for the question of fraudulent inducement to 
contract. The court based its opinion on the two pronged test of 
(Continued ... ) 
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